

# **Knoxville Bar Association**

## **Employment Law Update**

**September 13, 2012**

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# **Supreme Court Update**

**2011-2012 Supreme Court Term**

***Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church  
and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 696 (U.S. 2012)***

- S. Ct.’s seminal “ministerial exception” decision – courts cannot interfere in church’s selection of ministers.
- Grounded in 1<sup>st</sup> Amendment’s Freedom of Religion Clauses – applies to ministers and lay employees whose duties are “*primarily ministerial.*”
- S. Ct. held plaintiff was ministerial employee: (1) she was *held out as a minister* by the church; (2) *held herself out* as such; (3) received *significant religious training*; (4) charged with *leading others toward Christian faith.*

## ***Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (cont.)***

Some key points:

- The Establishment Clause prevents the government from appointing ministers; Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to choose ministers.
- Ministerial exception frees religious organizations from all employment discrimination laws, breach of contract suits, etc. with respect to ministers.
- Sixth Circuit's three errors: (1) failed to see relevance of being a *commissioned minister*; (2) gave *too much weight* to the fact that *lay teachers performed the same duties* as plaintiff; (3) *too much emphasis* on the *time spent performing secular* duties

## *Coleman v. Court of Appeals*, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (U.S. 2012)

- Conservative majority (5-4) holds that Congress failed to abrogate State's sovereign immunity in “self-care” (a/k/a “medical leave”) provision of FMLA. Distinguished *Hibbs v. DHS*.
- To abrogate sovereign immunity Congress must:
  - 1) Do so in “unmistakably clear language;”
  - 2) Tailor the remedy to “*prevent or remedy*” conduct *transgressing 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment’s substantive provisions*;
  - 3) There must be *congruence* and *proportionality* between the *injury* and the *remedy*;
- Here Congress was addressing “discrimination in illness, not sex;” – not substantive 14<sup>th</sup> A right.
- Any benefit to pregnant females is not “congruent and proportional” to remedy of universal medical leave.

***Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, No. 11-204, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4657 (June 18, 2012).**

- Conservative majority (5-4) refuses to defer to DOL's interpretation of the "outside salesman" provision of FLSA.
- Holds pharmaceutical detailers (a/k/a "drug reps.") fall within statutory and regulatory definition of "outside salesman."
- DOL's position that they do not make "sales" because they do not "transfer title" not entitled to any defense.

## *Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.*, (cont.)

- DOL had obviously acquiesced in industry's practice until the current administration.
- Deferring to the DOL's interpretation would “seriously undermine the principle that *agencies* should *provide* regulated parties ‘*fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.*’” The Court held:

“[I]t's one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an agency's interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another to require regulated parties to *divine the agency's interpretations in advance* or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference.”

*Arizona et al. v. United States,*  
**132 S. Ct. 2492 (U.S. 2012)**

- Supreme Court struck down employment-related aspect of Arizona's controversial immigration law.
- Arizona made it a criminal offense (misdemeanor) for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work ... in Arizona.”
- Held: The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) preempts Arizona law because the state law conflicts with the federal method of enforcement.
- State interfered with federal enforcement scheme which does not provide for criminal penalties to be placed on illegal workers.



# 2012-2013 Supreme Court Term

***Kloeckner v. Solis*, 639 F. 3d 834 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011),  
cert. granted by *Kloeckner v. Solis*, 132 S.Ct. 1088 (U.S. 2012)**

- Federal employees have two *mutually exclusive* options in “mixed” cases, i.e. when they are terminated for allegedly discriminatory reasons: (1) immediately appeal termination/discrimination to the MSPB; or (2) request a hearing before the EEOC.
- Plaintiff appealed termination to MSPB, then non-suited and requested EEOC hearing; EEOC dismissed without reaching merits; Secretary of Labor affirmed dismissal; *re-filed appeal* with MSPB which was *held time-barred*. Plaintiff appealed to district court – not Federal Circuit.
- Eighth Circuit held: if MSPB decides discrimination on merits, Congress intended appeal to district court; if MSPB case dismissed on procedural grounds, Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.

***Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. Tex. 2011), cert. granted by Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 132 S.Ct. 1536 (U.S. 2012)***

- Applicants sue University of Texas (“UT”) under Equal Protection Clause of 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment challenging its use of *race as one criteria* in student admissions.
- Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on *Gruetter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)* (Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit the Michigan Law School’s “narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefit that flow from a diverse student body.”)
- S. Ct. will determine if UT’s use of race as one factor in a complex admissions system falls within *Gruetter*.

***Vance v. Ball State Univ.*, 646 F.3d 461 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. Ind. 2011)**  
cert. granted by *Vance v. Ball State Univ.*, 2012 U.S. Lexis 4685  
(June 25, 2012)

- Seventh Circuit ***defines a supervisor*** for Title VII harassment purposes as an individual whose “authority primarily consists of the ***power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline*** an employee.”
- Other circuits have held “authority to ***direct*** an employee’s ***daily activities*** establishes supervisory status under Title VII.”
- Seventh Circuit held that team leader who could “***tell plaintiff what to do,***” but who had no other indicia of a supervisor, was a co-worker and not subject to *Faragher* and *Ellerth* analysis.

*U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen 663 F.3d 671 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2011)*

- Third Circuit holds ERISA authorizes courts to use equitable principles to rewrite clear plan language.
- Court refused to require participant to repay full plan benefits even where plan's terms give the absolute right to full reimbursement.
- Contrary to Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.

# Sixth Circuit Update

# Disability Discrimination

***Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.,***  
**681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Susan Lewis, often wheel-chair-bound RN, was discharged for profane outburst toward supervisor. Sued under ADA.
- Under *Monette*, Sixth Circuit has long applied “solely because of” disability standard of Rehab. Act.
- Lewis argued “motivating factor” test under Title VII applies. D. Ct. charged “solely because of” disability. Jury verdict for HAC.
- Sixth Circuit, sitting *en banc*, applied *Groce v. FLB*: (1) reversed *Monette*; (2) held “motivating factor” test inapplicable; (3) applied a “determining factor” test – a “but for” standard.



## ***Melange v. City of Center Line*, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11175 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Melange suffered closed head and subsequent shoulder injury; exhausted available leave. Bargaining agreement required either return to work or be terminated.
- City asked Melange's physicians to report on whether he could return to work. ***First doctor said, "No."*** City terminated him.
- ***Two weeks later***, second doctor said "***maybe.***"
- Melange sued under ADA claiming a failure to reasonably accommodate and engage in interactive process.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. "If employee never requests an accommodation, the employer's duty to engage in the interactive process is never triggered."

***Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp.*, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8640  
(6th Cir. 2012)**

- Wurzel, a forklift operator, had a disease that caused *heart spasms*, rendering him *temporarily incapacitated*; they *occurred frequently* and *without warning*.
- Whirlpool sought medical guidance through an IME; examining M.D. found Wurzel was a “*direct threat*;” Wurzel had sandbagged his two treating doctors who disagreed with examining M.D. Whirlpool terminated – “direct threat.”

## *Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., cont.*

- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ.

“Whirlpool’s determination that Wurzel posed a direct threat was based on a *reasonable medical judgment*, which relied on the *most current medical knowledge* and *best available objective evidence* and reflected an *individualized assessment* of Wurzel’s abilities.”

- Reasonable for Whirlpool to discount treating physicians’ opinions because Wurzel had understated the severity/frequency of spasms.

***Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc.*, 679 F.3d 475  
(6th Cir. 2012)**

- Regan’s ADA action claimed FAS failed to reasonably accommodate her *narcolepsy* which was adversely impacted by *new shift schedule*; asked to return to earlier arrival time to *avoid driving in “heavier traffic.”* FAS refused; Regan quit and sued.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. Regan’s request was not a reasonable accommodation required by ADA.
- “While an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations that *eliminate barriers in the work environment*, an employer is not required to *eliminate those barriers* which exist *outside the work environment.*”

# Family and Medical Leave Act

## ***Donald v. Sybra, Inc.*, 667 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Donald was assistant manager at Arby's. She took FMLA leave for multiple surgeries in 2006 and 2007.
- In February 2008, Donald's supervisor discovered that she was *stealing* from cash register. Donald went out for three-day illness but did not request FMLA. Arby's terminated her for stealing immediately upon her return, which she denied.
- Donald brought FMLA *interference* and *retaliation* claims, among others.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ applying *McDonnell Douglas* to *both* FMLA *interference* and *retaliation* claims. Donald failed to prove that Arby's legitimate reason – stealing – was pretextual; court applied "*honest belief*" rule.

## ***Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2012)***

- Happy Oktoberfest – you’re fired. Seeger, while on FMLA for herniated disc, declined limited light duty; co-workers reported seeing him at Oktoberfest walking/drinking beer; investigation ensued.
- HR Director terminated Seeger for “FMLA fraud” immediately upon his return to work. He sued for FMLA *interference* and *retaliation*.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. Seeger was given all of his leave negating his interference claim. *McDonnell Douglas* applied to retaliation claim
- *Temporal proximity alone* established *prima facie* case; however, Seeger was unable to overcome DBT’s *honest belief* that he was guilty of FMLA fraud. Court held:

“Nothing in the FMLA prevents employers from ensuring that employees who are on leave from work do not abuse that leave.”

## ***Thom v. Amer. Std., Inc., 666 F.3d 968 (6th Cir. 2012)***

- Textbook case on how to *mishandle* FMLA leave and *pay \$300k*.
- Thom, a 36 year employee, was *granted FMLA leave* for surgery *through 6/27; released early* for regular duty on 6/13; he could not return on 6/13 due to pain but submitted medical excuse on 6/17. ASI treated his 6/13-6/17 absences as *unexcused* and fired him.
- Thom sued for FMLA interference and retaliation; D. Ct. granted *MSJ for plaintiff* but denied liquidated damages.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ for plaintiff; reversed on liquidated damages. ASI's contention that it applied "rolling year method" to determine leave was *pretextual* where it had already granted leave beyond the end of rolling period, and never raised the defense until suit was filed.



# **Race and Sex Discrimination**

***Litton v. Talawanda Sch. Dist.*, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS  
13075 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Litton, custodian, transferred from high school to middle school; denied requests to return; told he *did not “fit in”* at HS. No other change in employment conditions.
- Litton sued for race discrimination. Jury found: (1) *no adverse employment action*; (2) but awarded \$50,000 damages.
- Sixth Circuit held that D. Ct. was *required to disregard* the “no adverse action” finding - - elements of *prima facie* case are irrelevant once it is submitted to jury.
- Stinging dissent by J. Batchelder – adverse employment action may be part of *prima facie* case, BUT it is also an *ultimate requirement* for *recovery*.

## ***Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs.*, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12515 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- ***Same-sex harassment case*** on oil rig with all male workforce. Wasek hazed by co-worker, sexual jokes, grabbing, etc. Told to “whip [co-worker’s] ass,” when he complained to management.
- Wasek walked off the job in frustration.
- Sixth Circuit held, to establish same sex harassment, plaintiff must prove: “(1) ‘***credible evidence*** that the harasser was ***homosexual***,’ (2) evidence that ‘make[s] it clear that the harasser is ***motivated by general hostility*** to the ***presence of [the same sex]*** in the ***workplace***,’ or (3) ‘***comparative evidence*** about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a ***mixed-sex workplace***’.”
- MSJ against Wasek affirmed. Allegation that harasser “may have been homosexual” was insufficient.

***Davis v. Omni-Care, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS  
11168 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Jose Davis complained of co-workers' *noose* made of *string*; Area Director, Gloria Calhoun, investigated and ordered diversity training.
- Davis wanted co-worker terminated; he refused to respond to managers' calls; Calhoun called and he refused to talk to her; she fired him for insubordination.
- Davis' claim that his managers had retaliatory motive and Calhoun was "*cat's paw*" rejected; Calhoun's decision not tainted by input from allegedly retaliatory manager.
- Cat's paw declawed.

***Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc.*, 669 F.3d 714  
(6th Cir. 2012)**

- Eleven African-American plaintiffs sued for racial harassment based on 25 years of scattered events (vulgar graffiti, racial comments, etc.)
- Sixth Circuit applied “*totality-of-the-circumstances*” test of *Jackson v. Quanax Corp.*
- Held: plaintiffs ***could not aggregate*** their claims because they failed to prove they were ***individually aware of*** the various ***public acts of harassment***.
- When asked individually in depositions to list all acts they were aware of, EEs did not testify about “public” acts or acts directed at others.

***Romans v. Mich. Dep't of Human Servs., 668 F.3d 826***  
**(6th Cir. 2012)**

- Romans, white, and Perteet, black, swapped allegations of racial harassment.
- Initial investigation by Hall-Thiam found Romans' harassment of Perteet "*may have been motivated by race.*"
- Office of Labor Relations decided to not take action on Hall-Thiam's report and conducted an independent investigation. Second investigation found Romans guilty of "discriminatory harassment of coworkers" and "threatening workplace violence," resulting in his termination.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. No causal connection between Hall-Thiam's racial comment/report and termination. Ultimate *decision maker conducted independent investigation* and did not rely on allegedly discriminatory report.

***Theus v. GlaxoSmithKline,***  
**452 Fed. Appx. 596 (6th Cir. 2011).**

- Rhonda Theus moonlighted as *purveyor of adult materials* (nude photos, live video broadcast); her female co-workers found out and relationships deteriorated at work.
- Theus claimed co-workers were harassing her (“bitch, whore, slut”); co-workers claimed she was threatening them. HRA manager interviewed eleven witnesses; terminated Theus for threatening to, “*go to my car and get my pistol and blow their ass away.*” Her suit for sexual harassment and retaliation dismissed on MSJ. Sixth Circuit affirmed.
- Her complaints of co-worker harassment not based on gender; she only alleged supervisor harassment *after* termination, and honest belief rule prevented pretext argument.

# Retaliation



## ***Algie v. N. Ky. Univ.*, 456 Fed. Appx. 415 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2012)**

- Algie, a “serial plaintiff,” filed *multiple charges/lawsuits*; while second charge was pending and four months after dismissal of first suit, NKU fired him for “*resume fraud, insubordination, constant monitoring of co-workers*, and certain safety concerns.”
- Algie sued under Title VII for retaliation. The *temporal proximity* alone held *sufficient* to establish *causal connection* element of *prima facie* case.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. Algie was unable to establish pretext; he had lied on his application; repeatedly criticized the “character and qualifications of supervisors,” and prior criminal charges justified the safety concerns.

***Krumheuer v. GAB Robins N. Am., Inc.*, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9999 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Krumheuer was selected for layoff for poor attendance, documented performance issues and written warnings.
- Prior to layoff, he experienced symptoms of *heart attack*, was diagnosed with *coronary heart disease*, requested leave for surgery, leave was granted but delayed, was shortly thereafter terminated in RIF.
- He brought FMLA *interference* (which he abandoned) and *retaliation* action. Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. Close *temporary proximity* was *sufficient* alone to establish *causal connection* for *prima facie* case. **But** GAB articulated legitimate reasons for selection in RIF - poor attendance/performance – and he failed to establish pretext.

***Kean v. IT-Works, Inc.,***  
**2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4918 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Kean, a female therapist, complained of sexual harassment by male co-worker; IT-Works took effective remedial action stopping the harassment.
- *2½ months later*, Kean was *terminated for gossiping* about the owner's poor financial condition.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ, dismissing hostile environment and retaliation claims. The *proximity in time (2½ months)* alone, without more, was *insufficient* to establish a causal connection.
- “Intervening favorable actions of an employer may not be a complete bar to recovery, but they assuredly weigh against a claim of retaliation.”

# Age Discrimination

***Segel v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.*, No. 10-2223, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6500 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2012).**

- Disagreeable Garry Segel, 53 year old salesman, was fired by KCC for “lack of flexibility,” documented in performance appraisals, customer complaints, 90-day Performance Improvement Plan, and 30-day Last Chance Agreement.
- Segel, relying on *White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.* argued that “flexibility” is highly subjective requiring jury to decide.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ, distinguished *White*, and held “inflexible,” although subjective, was “adequate where it was repeatedly utilized by varying people on numerous occasions.”

*Lefevers v. GAF Fiberglass Corp.*,  
**667 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2012)**

- Lefevers, age 58, laid off in RIF, claimed multiple “age-conscious statements” were direct evidence of pretext.
- E.g. “old Bob Dole,” “When are you going to retire,?” and, “There are some elderly supervisors that we have to do something with within the next year.”
- Sixth Circuit affirmed MSJ. Statements not direct evidence and the “elderly supervisor’s” statement was two years old.
- Documented poor performance in last performance appraisal not shown to be pretextual.

# Tennessee Update

***Gates v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
87533 (M.D. June 25, 2012)**

- Janette Gates complained to THRC re: gender discrimination by Nancy Tice (who was sleeping with Election Commission Chair, Greer).
- Greer ordered Gates to dismiss her charge; when she refused, he ordered EC Director Tische to terminate her.
- D. Ct. held “to be held liable as an aider and abettor under THRA” an individual must “*discourage his employer from taking remedial action.*”
- MSJ granted for Tische but denied for Greer who influenced EC management to not discipline his girlfriend and to fire Gates.