

# **Kramer Rayson LLP**

**Employment Law Conference**  
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# **Employment Law Update**

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# **Supreme Court Update**

**2009-2010 Supreme Court Term**

***Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,***  
**2010 U.S. LEXIS 4981 (U.S. June 21, 2010)**

- Arbitration agreement covered *all disputes arising out of employment*, including *validity*.
- Plaintiff sued for discrimination, claimed agreement was “unconscionable.” Employer moved to compel arbitration under FAA.
- D. Ct. ordered arbitration; Ninth Circuit reversed.
- Supreme Court held where agreement *specifies arbitrator decides enforceability* of the agreement as a whole, arbitrator decides challenges.
- Where a party challenges the validity of the *arbitration clause itself*, the court considers the challenge.

## *City of Ontario v. Quon,* 130 S. Ct. 2619 (U.S. 2010)

- SWAT team members sued City under **Fourth Amendment** for reviewing text messages on City-owned pagers.
- City policy diminished privacy expectation; practice arguably created such expectation.
- D. Ct. held *plaintiffs had privacy expectation* - and legality turned on “*purpose*” of the search. *Jury* found it was for *legitimate* purpose.
- Ninth Circuit agreed on privacy expectation but held search not “*reasonable in scope,*” because “*less intrusive ways*” existed to answer work-related question.
- Supreme Court reversed, assumed privacy expectation, found search reasonable based on *legitimate purpose* and *limited scope* of the search.
- Rejected the “*least intrusive search practical*” approach.

# *Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters*, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (U.S. 2010)

- Union strikes, *Local U.* ratifies settlement, then *IBT* continues strike.
- Employer sues Local under LMRA § 301 for violating no-strike clause and IBT for “intentional interference with contract.”
- D. Ct. (a *jury*) decided contract formation issues for employer; Ninth Circuit reversed, ordered *arbitration of formation issue*.
- Supreme Court held arbitration must “*arise under*” the contract, formation issue cannot arise under the contract, thus its for the court.
- Affirmed dismissal of IBT under tort theory.

## *Conkright v. Frommert,* 130 S. Ct. 1640 (U.S. 2010)

- Plaintiff sued plan administrator under ERISA over benefit evaluation (they had *retired, drew lump sum* and *were rehired*).
- Plan administrator's first interpretation ("*phantom account*") rejected.
- Administrator's second interpretation *rejected* by D. Ct. which refused to apply "deferential standard." Second Circuit affirmed.
- Supreme Court reversed: plan administrator's interpretation entitled to ERISA-required deference, despite previous erroneous decision.
- Court rejects, "One strike and you're out" under ERISA and trust law. The *deference must be given unless* administrator acts in "*bad faith*."

*Lewis v. Chicago,*  
**130 S. Ct. 2191 (U.S. 2010)**

- Chicago *announced* firefighter **eligibility list** based on test with **disparate impact**.
- Black applicants filed EEOC charge alleging Title VII disparate impact **420 days after implementation**.
- Seventh Circuit held **charge untimely** – the only discrimination was using test to develop the list.
- Supreme Court reversed: **disparate impact** claim can be based on “**use**” of unlawful practice, regardless of when the practice was implemented. 7<sup>th</sup> Cir. conflated disparate treatment and disparate impact cases.



***New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,***  
**130 S. Ct. 2635 (U.S. 2010)**

- Circuit split developed after the NLRB, which normally has five members, spent 27 months (over 600 cases) issuing decisions as a *two-member body*.
- Seventh Circuit held that the two-person Board was a valid quorum of the three-person group delegated hearing authority.
- Supreme Court (5-4) reversed, invalidating over 600 decisions made by the NLRB under current administration.
- Lesson learned: our government at work! How to untangle this mess not discussed.

***Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co.,***  
**130 S. Ct. 2149 (U.S. 2010)**

- Plaintiff sued for *long term disability benefits* under ERISA.
- D. Ct. *denied her MSJ*, but found “*compelling evidence*” in her favor. Remanded to insurer for “reconsideration.”
- On remand, insurer agreed, awarded benefits.
- Plaintiff filed motion for attorneys fees.
- Fourth Circuit held Plaintiff *not “prevailing party.”*
- Supreme Court reversed, holding attorney’s fees can be awarded if claimant achieved “*some degree of success on the merits.*”

# The Current Supreme Court Term

***Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP*, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5525 (U.S. June 29, 2010)**

- Plaintiff was fired after *fiancée* charged race discrimination. He sued for Title VII retaliation.
- D. Ct. granted MSJ. Plaintiff did not “*oppose*” or “*make a charge, testify, assist or participate*” as required by § 704 (a).
- Sixth Circuit panel reversed; *en banc* court affirmed. Plaintiff not within scope of *clear language* of § 704 (a).
- Supreme Court to decide:  
Does § 704(a) prohibit retaliation against a third party spouse, family member, fiancé, “*closely associated*” with complainant? Can the *third party sue* under § 704(a)? Limits?

***Staub v. Proctor Hosp.*, 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009),  
cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 2089 (U.S. 2010)**

- Supreme Court to address “*cat’s paw*” theory, i.e. biased supervisor exerts influence on unbiased decisionmaker.
- Plaintiff brought USERRA discrimination, claimed biased supervisor convinced decisionmaker to fire him. Jury agreed.
- Seventh Circuit reversed. Though biased supervisor had input, she did not have “*singular influence*” over decision-maker who had *no animus* and *conducted reasonable investigation*.
- Supreme Court will finally decide standards for employer liability for non-decisionmaker bias.

***Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.*,  
570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. Wis. 2009), cert. granted 130 S.  
Ct. 1890 (U.S. 2010)**

- FLSA retaliation case. Plaintiff complained *orally* over perceived FLSA violation; was terminated for refusing to clock in. Sued under FLSA for retaliation.
- District court granted motion for summary judgment for employer. § 215(a)(3) requires plaintiff to “file a complaint.”
- Seventh Circuit affirmed. Employee did not “*file a complaint*” which requires “*submission of some writing.*”
- Supreme Court to decide whether *oral complaint* suffices under § 215(a)(3).

***Nelson v. NASA*, 530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. Cal. 2008)  
*cert. granted* 130 S. Ct. 1755 (U.S. 2010)**

- “***Informational privacy***” case. NASA required all Caltech employees to undergo standard background checks.
- “Low risk” scientists sued claiming breach of “informational privacy” per *Whalen v. Roe*, which established “***individual right in disclosure of private matters.***”
- Ninth Circuit found ***privacy invasion*** in questions about ***recent drug/alcohol treatment***, and asking ***references*** about financial integrity, drug and alcohol use, mental stability.
- Supreme Court to decide: can government constitutionally ask these questions ***solely for employment purposes*** with Privacy Act protection.

***Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC*, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. Cal. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (U.S. 2010)**

- California state law making class action waivers “unconscionable” collides with arbitration agreement governed by FAA.
- Plaintiff brought class action suit for deceptive trade practice charging tax on: “free” cell phones; contract had arbitration clause and “class action waiver clause.”
- D. Ct. and Ninth Circuit denied employer’s motion under FAA to refer *individual claims* to arbitration. Held FAA does not preempt state law prohibition.
- Supreme Court to decide: does FAA preempt California’s state “unconscionability law.”



***Amara v. CIGNA Corp.*, 348 Fed. Appx.  
627 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted  
2010 U.S. LEXIS 5324 (U.S. June 28, 2010)**

- Addresses standard to be applied under ERISA to prevail where *SPD plan description* conflicts with the *plan*. Second Circuit holds plaintiffs must show “*likely harm*” to prevail.
- 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Circuits require “*some degree of reliance*” to prevail.
- 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Circuits require only a “*clear and material conflict*.”
- Supreme Court to resolve conflict between circuits.

# Sixth Circuit Update

# Race Discrimination

*Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc.*,  
**610 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 2010)**

- Arab-American Muslim pilot filed an EEOC charge alleging religion and national origin discrimination.
- His lawsuit *added* hostile work environment and retaliation.
- D. Ct. granted MSJ, holding Plaintiff *failed to exhaust remedies* on harassment claim and lacked *prima facie* case on balance of claims.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed, plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies on hostile work environment claim, listing only a few disparate examples of biased statements, and on retaliation, citing no retaliatory facts and omitting checking retaliation box.

***Thompson v. UHHS Richmond Heights Hosp., Inc.*, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7439 (6th Cir. 2010)**

- Black plaintiff’s “Food Production Supervisor” job was eliminated in a reorganization shell game. Replaced by less experienced white in re-titled “Chef 1” job. Employer did not tell plaintiff either that her job was being eliminated or about the Chef 1 job.
- Sixth Circuit reversed MSJ, holding: facts support inference that reorganization conducted to eliminate plaintiff’s job and discourage her from applying for new job.
- Key evidence: decision maker told her successor to get rid of three black “troublemakers,” and had also called plaintiff “troublemaker.”

# Age Discrimination

## ***Schoonmaker v. Spartan Graphics Leasing, LLC,*** **595 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2010)**

- RIF case. Plaintiff alleged age discrimination due to age differential (58 to 29) and that decisionmaker did not follow the layoff RIF criteria.
- D. Ct. dismissed, plaintiff failed to establish *prima facie* case.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed in primer on RIF law. Plaintiff's *prima facie* case failed because age ***differential alone not enough***. She was not “***replaced,***” and she adduced no “***additional circumstantial, direct or statistical evidence.***”
- Supervisor was ***unaware*** of the RIF guidelines, thus his failure to strictly follow them not evidence of discrimination.

# Religion Discrimination



## *EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.*, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010)

- Plaintiff considered a “*called*” teacher and “*commissioned minister*” at religious school. She was diagnosed with narcolepsy and terminated. Sued alleging ADA discrimination and retaliation.
- Under First Amendment, courts have no jurisdiction over selection of “ministers” - - the “*ministerial exemption*.”
- D. Ct. granted Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff was a “ministerial employee.”
- Sixth Circuit, Judge Clay, reversed. Plaintiff’s primary duty was secular, based largely on *amount of time spent* teaching secular courses, despite teaching religion 45 minutes daily.
- Other Circuits only require position to be “important to spiritual mission of the church,” irrespective of time.

# Disability Discrimination

*Spees v. James Marine, Inc.,*  
**2010 FED App. 0236P (6th Cir. 2010)**

- Pregnant plaintiff welder with *history of difficult pregnancies* is told to get “light duty” restrictions. She complies and is transferred to tool room and then to night shift. Doctor subsequently orders bed rest and she is terminated. Sues - - Title VII and ADA.
- D. Ct. held: transfer to tool room **not** an adverse action, termination **not** due to pregnancy, and pregnancy **not** a disability.
- Sixth Circuit affirms on **termination**, reverses on **transfer** to tool room. It **was an adverse action** based on less desirable (to plaintiff) duties and shift.
- Court also reversed on ADA, holding plaintiff had established a “*regarded as*” claim. Pregnancy is not a disability, but *abnormalities with pregnancy* can be a disability, and can support “regarded as” claim.

***James v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,***  
**354 Fed. Appx. 246 (6th Cir. 2009)**

- Functional capacity test approved.
- Plaintiff with *multiple sclerosis* ordered to submit to FCE - - co-worker complaints increasing difficulty doing job and safety concerns. Plaintiff took a medical retirement instead and sued under the ADA.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal: (1) a valid FCE is *not* an adverse employment action; (2) Goodyear had *right* to require FCE to determine if he was a “direct threat” of harm to himself or co-workers; and (3) plaintiff could not challenge scope of FCE because he *refused* to take it, no evidence of scope.

# Harassment

***West v. Tyson Foods,***  
**2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7863 (6th Cir. 2009)**

- Complete lack of responsiveness to sexual harassment complaint creates million dollar liability.
- Bad facts, serious sexual harassment over *only 5 weeks*, plaintiff complains to designated supervisor. He moves her but does not advise HR or take action against the harassers. Plaintiff quits two weeks later.
- Sixth Circuit affirms ***\$1.8 million verdict*** - \$65,000 back pay, \$65,000 front pay, \$750,000 emotional distress and \$400,000 punitive damages.
- Lessons learned abound. Policy alone not enough, **must train employees and supervisors, and enforce the policy**. Here Tyson tolerated pervasive sexual harassment by Hispanic males. Policy ignored by everyone, including HR.

# **Fair Labor Standards Act**

***Franklin v. Kellogg Company, 2010***  
**U.S. App LEXIS 8134 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. August 31, 2010)**

- ***Key donning and doffing*** case where Sixth Circuit slaps down DOL's new interpretation of "clothing" under §203(0) of Portal to Portal Act.
- Ununionized employer had 18-year practice **not** paying for donning/doffing "***uniforms***" and "***standard safety gear***" (hair and beard nets, safety glasses, ear plugs and caps). Employee sued under FLSA.
- Sixth Circuit held: action for donning/doffing "**uniform**" and "**required safety gear**" constituted "changing clothes" under §203(0).
- §203(0) is a "***definition***" - - not a narrowly construed "***exemption.***"
- Declined to follow **DOL's June 16, 2010 Interpretation**. Department's shifting opinions entitled to less deference. Rejected Department's position that dictionary definition of clothes did not apply. Webster says "clothes" are anything "covering the body."



## *Franklin v. Kellogg Company, cont.*

- Court also addressed whether walking from locker room to clock in was “working time,” ruling here in favor of plaintiffs.
- During a “*continuous work day*” walking between first “*principal activity*” and before last “*principal activity*” is compensable.
- Held: activities deemed excluded under §203(0) *may still be “principal activities.”* Principal activities must be “*integral and indispensable*” to employees’ work.
- *Changing clothes is integral and indispensable*, thus a “principal activity.” It follows that walking from locker room to time clock is compensable. Remanded for *de minimus* analysis.

# **Family and Medical Leave Act**

***Branham v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.,***  
**2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18328 (6th Cir. 2010)**

- Plaintiff claimed she was ill and missed several weeks of work. Her employer informed her *orally* that she would need to fill out an FMLA medical certification.
- Her doctor provided a *negative certification* and she was terminated. On 15<sup>th</sup> day, she submitted certification covering her absences.
- D. Ct. granted defendant MSJ; Sixth Circuit reversed.
- The defendant's *oral request* "never properly triggered the [plaintiff's] duty to provide a medical certification." The negative certification was not sufficient basis to deny leave because the *required 15 days had not elapsed*.

***Cutcher v. Kmart Corp.***,  
**364 Fed. Appx. 183 (6th Cir. 2010)**

- Plaintiff Kmart employee on FMLA leave was terminated in a RIF. Her scores on RIF evaluation dropped from those on her performance appraisal issued 20 days earlier -- just enough to put her on RIF list.
- “LOA” was noted next to her name on RIF evaluation form.
- D. Ct. granted Kmart MSJ; Sixth Circuit reversed.
- A jury *could* conclude the proffered reasons were pretextual, including *reduced scores right after her appraisal*, admission that no new incident or issue had occurred causing the reduction, and *“LOA” notation on RIF form*.

# **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA")**

# Escher vs. BWXT Y-12 LLC

## No. 09-6054 (6<sup>th</sup> Circuit Aug. 18, 2010)

- Escher was Navy Reserve Captain and highly paid manager. He complained to Y-12 Compensation in July 2005 that his military leave was being accounted for in violation of USERRA.
- August 17, 2005, anonymous e-mail resulted in investigation of Escher's e-mail use. Results shocking (3,200 e-mails, 240 folders, hundreds of Navy documents on Y-12 computer system).
- Escher was terminated after *thorough investigation*, just like 10 prior terminations for violation of strict computer-use policy.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge Jordan's decision. Plaintiff failed to establish retaliatory motive, employer met burden of proving it would have made the same decision anyway.
- Applies "modified honest belief rule."

# Tennessee Developments

## *Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co.,* 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. 2010)

- Plaintiff *refused to falsify an inventory report*, believing it was illegal. Promptly terminated allegedly to reduce the workforce.
- Plaintiff sued pursuant to common law retaliatory discharge for violation of public policy .
- The trial court granted summary judgment because it was undisputed that plaintiff did not report the allegedly illegal activity to anyone. The Court of Appeals reversed.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
  - the *McDonnell Douglas* framework is *inapplicable* at the summary judgment stage because it is incompatible with Tennessee’s summary judgment jurisprudence.
  - “*refusal to participate does not require that silence be broken for a claim to exist.*”
- Very unfortunate case.



***Hamilton-Ryker Group, LLC v. Keymon,* 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010).**

- How *not* to leave your employer case.
- Plaintiff sued its former manager for breaching noncompetition covenants and violating the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TSA”).
- While on paid leave, defendant *e-mailed herself 56 key documents*, allowing her immediately compete on major contract. The trial court found Keymon was liable on all claims, awarded actual damages of \$ **477,178**, **doubled as exemplary damages to \$954,356** under the TSA based on Keymon’s willful and malicious violation.
- Court of Appeals’ decision is primer on (1) enforcement of covenant to solicit employees, (2) broad scope of TSA (which really protects “confidential information ‘beyond’ trade secrets,”) and (3) damages.

***VanCleave v. Reelfoot Bank*, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS  
724 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009)**

- Common law and TPPA retaliatory discharge case. Plaintiff fired by bank for refusing to open questionable account for major customer.
- Trial Court held the purported banking law violation did not implicate “significant public policy or illegal activities” and plaintiff’s intent was to protect the bank, not the public.
- Judge Holly Kirby reversed. The Bank Security Act regulations evidence clear and *important public policy*. In *refusing to participate in illegal activity*, plaintiff not required to show subjective intent to further public good.

***Lamore v. Check Advance of Tenn., LLC, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010)***

- Plaintiff *reported suspected child abuse* by her manager and was fired for pretextual reason. She was protected by TCA §37-1-410(b).
- Jury unloaded: \$9,000 back pay, \$10,000 front pay, and \$500,000 punitive (where defendant was only worth \$600,000). Punitive damages were appealed on due process grounds.
- Judge Susano writes thorough and thoughtful summary of applicable federal law and limits punitives.
- Court affirmed reduction of \$500,000 award to \$250,000, which is still *40% of net worth* and *13.5 times compensatory*.

***Harman v. Univ. of Tenn.*, 2010 Tenn.  
App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2010).**

- Plaintiff was *UT Chattanooga department head*. He gave a bad evaluation to a professor up for tenure, and refused to change it at the Dean's direction, was then removed as department head but retained as professor.
- Sued under Tennessee Public Protection Act which prohibits "*termination or discharge*" for "refusal to participate in or remain silent about illegal activity."
- The trial court dismissed because plaintiff had not been discharged or terminated and had not refused to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that plaintiff "wasn't discharged or terminated," rather he had only been "*demoted*."

# Legislation

# FEDERAL LEGISLATION

- **GINA**
  - Prohibits discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating on the basis of *genetic information*, and *intentionally acquiring genetic information* about applicants and employees, and establishes strict confidentiality requirements regarding genetic information.
- **FMLA**
  - Expands those for whom employees may take “*qualified exigency leave*” from Guard and Reserve to “all members of Armed Forces” *and* “*expands military care giver*” leave to cover veterans for up to five (5) years.
- **PPACA**
  - Patient Protection and Affordability Care Act 2010, requires employers to provide “reasonable break time for nursing mothers” to express breast milk.

## TENNESSEE LEGISLATION

- **SB 2753**
  - Allows employers to require their employees to speak English on the job whenever there is a “legitimate business or safety necessity.”
- **SB 2633**
  - Allow employers to *require* employees to be paid by direct deposit or, if the employee does not want direct deposit, by a prepaid debit card.
- **SB 0682**
  - Clarifies that the civil cause of action for the retaliatory discharge of an employee for reporting illegal activities applies to *state employees, private employees, and certain persons paid by the federal government.*